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Introduction 
Entry mode, or the way companies choose to operate in foreign markets, is a critical business 
decision, and the theoretical contributions in the area have been more advanced than those 
concerning other topics of the firm's internationalization process (Andersen 1977). Extant 
research has tended to focus on the initial entry mode decision, while relatively few studies 
have addressed how businesses later change operation mode (Calof and Beamish, 1995; 
Chetty and Agndal, 2007). Hence, most current literature in this problem area is static since 
scholars have paid little attention to changes in the initial entry mode (Pedersen et al., 2002). 
This finding depicts a serious void in our understanding of international business because 
most success in international business depends on the careful management and continuous 
development of operations.  
For many companies, and especially companies at the early stages of 
internationalization, using independent intermediaries tends to be the preferred entry mode. 
The international success of many exporting firms hinges on the performance of these 
intermediaries (Root 1987; Petersen et al., 2006). Several studies have found the performance 
of independent intermediaries is influenced by the characteristics of the interorganizational 
relations between the principals and the agents (e.g., Bello and Gilliland, 1997; Nes et al., 
2007). The performance, broadly speaking, may impact whether relationships with 
independent intermediaries are terminated or retained. Trust, commitment, control, and 
communication are important drivers (directly or indirectly) of performance in relations with 
independent intermediaries (Bello and Gilliland, 1997; Nes et al., 2007). Whether the 
evaluations of the performance drivers and of performance itself are different between 
terminated and retained intermediary relationships is important for the exporters and for the 
intermediaries. For example, the intermediaries may use such insight to evaluate the 
likelihood of future contract termination when they consider eventual specific investments. 
Whether trust, commitment, control, communication and performance tend to improve after 
the intermediary is replaced is, of course, of high interest for exporters. The objectives of our 
study are to elucidate (1) whether the trust, commitment, control, communication and 
performance are different in relationships where the foreign intermediaries are replaced 
compared to relationships that are retained, (2) whether control and performance change after 
the replacement, and (3) whether objective 1 and 2 depend on the type of replacement 
(appointment of new independent intermediary or change to  hierarchal operation mode). The 
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study applies interorganizational relationship theory in a new setting. We attempt to attain the 
objectives by surveying a sample of exporters twice with 5 years interval. We collected 
information regarding actual intermediary replacements in the 5-year period in the second 
survey. This study is the first to analyze the role of these variables in intermediary 
replacements, and it is the first to analyze the outcome of actual intermediary replacements.  
Transaction cost theory postulates two main alternatives of organizing economic 
activity: market or hierarchy. In market solutions, the company outsources the tasks to an 
outside company (e.g., an independent export intermediary). In hierarchical solutions, the 
company integrates the tasks within the company (e.g., via a sales subsidiary or via home-
based direct sales). In an on-going business, the replacement of an independent intermediary 
may have several outcomes (Benito et al., 2009). The discussion in our study relates to two 
types of replacements. First, we characterize replacements whereby independent 
intermediaries are replaced by new independent intermediaries as market-to-market 
replacements. Second, we characterize replacements whereby independent intermediaries are 
replaced by a new hierarchal operation mode as market-to-hierarchy replacements. 
Independent intermediaries in our study are either agents or distributors (importers), and the 
hierarchal operation mode involves using a sales subsidiary or home-based direct sales. It has 
been argued that using agents represents a quasi-integrated operation mode (Klein et al.,1990; 
Bello and Lohtia, 1995). If this were the case in our study, it would make our market-to-
market and the market-to-hierarchy distinction less meaningful. However, a study by Solberg 
and Nes (2002) found no differences between exporters’ evaluations of agents and distributors 
concerning trust, commitment, and performance, but agents gave the exporter a higher degree 
of control. This indicates that control depends on the agent-distributor distinction, but that 
trust, commitment, and performance do not. Much of marketing’s contribution to the original 
transaction cost theory has been identification of the range of intermediate governance 
structures between market transactions and internal organization. We do not distinguish 
between pure market and intermediate governance forms, but apply the market to market and 
market to hierarchy distinctions as two categories of independent intermediary replacements.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we review the literature on 
intermediary replacements. Next, we develop the hypotheses, and then describe the 
methodology and analysis. Finally, we discuss conclusions and the implications of the study. 
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Review of the intermediary replacement literature 
In this section, we and critically review and integrate the literature pertaining to replacements 
of independent intermediaries.  The operation-mode-change literature is only reviewed to the 
extent it concerns replacement of intermediaries.   
The stages theories (or internationalization process theories) are some of the earliest 
research pertaining to changes in operation mode (Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1984; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009). In the early stages of internationalization, companies tend 
to work through independent intermediaries. Movement to a new stage is motivated by 
increased knowledge of the foreign markets, and the knowledge serves to decrease uncertainty 
about making foreign investments. Firms moving from one stage to another tend to follow a 
pattern of increasing commitments, moving from the low-commitment operation mode that 
involves independent intermediaries to a more committed mode that involves hierarchical 
organization of the distribution (e.g. sales subsidiary). The stages models therefore may 
explain market-to-hierarchy replacements of independent intermediaries, but not market-to-
market replacements. The stages models are also consistent with the opposite movement, for 
example the closing of distant subsidiaries by inexperienced born globals, and developments 
of new operations by the same born globals in close-by countries (Gabrielsson and Pelkonen, 
2008).  
The studies that concern replacements of intermediaries and operation mode changes 
draw on a mixture of theories from different traditions (transaction cost theory, agency theory, 
and behavioral theories). The mixture used may be influenced by the studies’ respective 
focuses. The motives for market-to-market replacements may be different from the motives 
for market-to-hierarchy replacements. Some studies focus on operation mode change only 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1987; Calof, 1993; Calof and Bemisch, 1995; Pedersen et al., 2002; Chetty 
and Agndal, 2007; Agndal and Chetty, 2007). Of those studies, only Pedersen et al. (2002) is 
directed specifically toward market-to-hierarchy replacements of independent intermediaries, 
while the other studies in the group pertain to all kinds of operation mode changes (e.g., 
distribution, production, licensing, etc.). Benito et al. (2005) and Petersen et al. (2006) 
include both market-to-market replacements and market-to-hierarchy replacements. Ellis 
(2005) uses intentions to terminate an independent intermediary as a dependent variable and 
does not include post-replacement alternatives.  
While all of those studies contribute to our understanding of intermediary 
replacement, only Petersen et al. (2000), Pedersen et al. (2002), Benito et al. (2005), Ellis 
(2005), and Petersen et al. (2006) have independent intermediary replacements as their main 
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focus. The inferences from the studies that have independent intermediary replacements as 
their main focus seemingly are from two databases only (circa 80 replacements among Danish 
exporters and 86 replacements of domestic Chinese independent export intermediaries). The 
small sample sizes of actual replacements are partly because the studies concern changes 
within a defined period and partly because several exporters may be needed to find one case 
that is representative for the study’s focus. The lack of research attention on independent 
intermediary replacement is surprising since the quality of the independent intermediary is 
heralded in many contexts as one of the most important prerequisites for export success.  
The differences in focus we discuss above limits the generalizations that can be done 
across studies. Instead, each study, or series of studies using the same dataset, gives unique 
insight into the problem area, with little replication. Still, a few generalizations across studies 
can be suggested. Ellis (2005) and Petersen et al. (2006) both found a U-shaped relationship 
(also called “the trader’s dilemma”) between propensity to terminate the intermediary 
contract, or actual replacement, and performance attitude measures. Both studies expected 
market-to-market switches to be driven by low performance and market-to-hierarchy switches 
to be driven by high performance, but this was not confirmed in any of the studies. The 
importance of switching costs (Petersen et al., 2000) and the related liability role of social 
capital (Agndal and Chetty, 2007) seem to be important deterrents of intermediary 
replacements. Whether growth in the host market stimulates switch to a more hierarchical 
operation mode has mixed support. Gomes-Casseres (1987) found that economic growth in 
the host market was a driver of switching operation mode from joint venture to wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and Calof (1993) found most mode changes were influenced by changed 
perceptions of sales potential. Benito et al. (2005), on the other hand, found export market 
growth not to be a significant predictor of intermediary replacements for either market-to-
market replacements or market-to-hierarchy replacements. The change process seems to be 
only partly rational, and “gut feel” seems to play a role in most changes (Calof, 1993).  
The research designs in previous studies are typically cross sectional or case studies. 
All studies except Ellis (2005) concern actual changes. The inferences from Petersen et al. 
(2000), Pedersen et al. (2002), Benito et al. (2005), and Petersen et al. (2006) concern 
motivators and deterrents of intermediary replacements, and are based on pre-change data of 
actual changes within a 5-year period. Their respective designs have longitudinal elements, 
but those designs do not encompass analysis of outcomes of intermediary replacements. The 
inferences from Gomes-Casseres (1987), Calof (1993), Calof and Bemisch (1995), Chetty and 
Agndal (2007, and Agndal and Chetty (2007) are based on analysis of post-change data of 
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actual changes only. Their designs may suffer from problems because of the time span 
between the problems studied and the data collection (e.g., human memory). To study the 
consequences of intermediary replacements and operation mode changes, a longitudinal 
design that measures the same variables pre- and post-replacement would add new insights. 
 There are two partners in an exporter-intermediary relationship, but all studies have 
collected data from the exporter only. All studies seem to assume that the exporter is 
instrumental in terminating the intermediary, but this is of course not always the case. For 
example, the intermediary may be dissatisfied with the principal due to quality problems, lack 
of profitability, lack of support, too narrow product line, or perhaps the intermediary received 
an exclusive offer from a more attractive competitor. Preferably, the dyad should be studied 
and not only the principal. 
 Finally, our understanding of replacement of exporter-intermediary relationships may 
expand from applying behavioral constructs from the well-developed interorganizational 
relations theory. This theory is based on transaction cost theory, agency theory, and 
behavioral theories. Transaction cost theory and agency theory are applied in several of the 
studies (e.g., Petersen et al., 2000; Pedersen et al., 2002; Benito et al., 2005; Petersen et al., 
2006). However, no studies include behavioral constructs such as trust, commitment, and 
communication. Research in interorganizational relations in general (e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 
1994) and international interorganizational relations (e.g., Leonidou et al., 2011; Nes et al., 
2007) has shown these constructs may be instrumental in buyer-seller relationships, and they 
thus may contribute to our insight into antecedents and consequences of replacements of 
exporter-intermediary relationships. 
 
Development of hypotheses 
There is a wealth of interorganizational literature, and a review of this literature is outside the 
scope of our study. Rather, we draw on the international and non-international studies that are 
most important for our line of reasoning and for the international setting.  
The interorganizational relationship theories draw on economic and behavioral 
explanations of the exchange relationship. Economic theories include transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1985) and agency theory (Bergen et al., 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989). Economic 
theories that explain the exchange relationships are characterized by factors such as 
uncertainty, specific investments, switching costs, information asymmetry, and opportunism. 
Behavioral explanations emphasize the roles of social structure, interdependence, norms, and 
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history in the relationship. The behavioral variables include variables like trust, commitment, 
communication, relationship distance, and cooperation. A poor relationship with the 
intermediate may be associated with poor performance, but a poor relationship may also be a 
reason for replacement by itself because a poor relationship gives little hope for future 
improvements. The behavioral constructs are essential in a more profound understanding of 
motives for independent intermediary replacement, and changes in the levels of the variables 
following the replacement are of vital interest as indicators of success or failure.  
 There are good reasons for an exporter to consider terminating its contract with an 
independent intermediary with unsatisfactory performance, poor communication, low trust, 
and unsatisfactory control of the marketing operations. Following an eventual replacement of 
the low-performing intermediary, the exporter may, in an ongoing operation, appoint a new 
independent intermediary or invest in a hierarchal operation mode (e.g. sales subsidiary or 
home-based direct sales). Replacing a low-performing intermediary with a new independent 
intermediary is quite straightforward with regard to economic motives. Replacing a low-
performing intermediary with a hierarchal operation mode, however, implies the new unit will 
start on a low performance (and low income) level. A relationship characterized by high trust, 
and communication is a fine base for an exporter’s knowledge development (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977, 2009), and the opposite is the case for low-performing relationships. Learning 
and knowledge development are core concepts in the internationalization process theories. 
Thus, we argue that the success of a transition to hierarchal operation mode is influenced by 
the behavioral variables where high scores have a positive impact and low scores have a 
negative impact. Moving from a market entry mode to hierarchy by acquiring a local 
company is also more likely to succeed if it is preceded by a history of exchange between the 
acquirer and the acquiree (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). In such relationships, the parties have 
already developed a body of knowledge about each other. Finally, replacing a high 
performing independent intermediary implies that the exporter may have higher income base 
for a new hierarchal entry mode than in a case with a low performing intermediary. 
The paradox that  intermediary contracts are likely to be terminated when the 
intermediary fails, but sometimes even when the intermediary succeeds, have long been 
observed (Ellis, 2005; Kelly and Lecraw, 1985; Petersen et al., 2006), and have been called 
“the trader’s dilemma.” The trader’s dilemma implies that the link between the exporter’s 
perception of the intermediary’s performance is U-shaped, and this U-shape was established 
empirically by Ellis (2005) and Petersen et al. (2006). However, there is yet no clear 
empirical support for the premise that weak performance drives market to market switches 
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and strong performance drives market-to-hierarchy replacements. We expect in our study that 
market-to-market replacements of independent intermediaries have lower pre-replacement 
evaluations of performance than retained relationships. Based on our discussion above we 
also argue that market-to-hierarchy switches have higher pre-replacement evaluations of 
performance than retained relationships.  
We distinguish between behavioral variables that concern the relation with the foreign 
intermediary (trust, communication, commitment) and variables that concern the foreign 
market (control and performance). The interorganizational relations in hierarchal operation 
modes are with direct customers rather than intermediaries, and comparisons of trust, 
communication and commitment between direct customers and intermediaries are quite 
meaningless. Control and performance, however, concern the foreign market where it is both 
highly interesting and meaningful to compare the effects of both market to market- and of  
market to hierarchy replacements.   We expect that the decision to replace an independent 
intermediary with a new independent intermediary in general is based on sufficient situation 
analysis and effective implementation. Then, the replacements are successful, and the 
evaluations of trust, commitment, communication and performance should improve and post-
replacement evaluations should be higher than the pre-replacement evaluations. Following the 
same reasoning, we argue that control and performance are higher after termination than 
before termination of the independent intermediary when the intermediary is replaced by a 
new hierarchal entry mode (sales subsidiary or direct home based sales).  
 
Communication 
The success of business relationships over the long run is contingent on the partners’ ability to 
communicate effectively throughout the relationship’s duration (Mohr, Fisher and Nevin, 
1996), and indeed, effective communication between international business partners may be 
considered critical for global success (Griffith, 2002). The role of communication in a 
relationship with a foreign intermediary is somewhat extended compared to a domestic 
intermediary since the foreign intermediary is generally a more important information source 
regarding local domestic business factors (Benito et al., 1993; Gripsrud et al., 2006). Poor 
communication is an obstacle to obtaining such information. Lack of knowledge about foreign 
markets is considered a major obstacle to successful international operations, and such 
knowledge comes inevitably from the firms’ own operations (Johnson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Lack of two-way communication will also likely result in asymmetric information between 
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the parties. Asymmetric information is related to opportunism in the sense that without a 
condition of asymmetric information, opportunism would be easily detected. Petersen et al. 
(2000) found the level of information asymmetry influenced the decision to replace the 
foreign intermediary. We have previously argued that low evaluations of the intermediary is a 
motive for terminating the relationship with the present intermediary, and high evaluations of 
the intermediary is a motive for replacing the independent intermediary with a hierarchal 
operation mode. In line with this, we expect that exporters’ evaluations of the two-way 
communication with the intermediaries prior to replacements are lower in market-to-market 
replacements than in retained relationships, but higher than retained relationships in market-
to-hierarchy replacements.  
In line with our previous reasoning, we expect that the communication with the new 
independent intermediary is improved compared to the communication with the replaced 
intermediary. 
 
Trust 
Trust between partners is a key dimension in any business venture, and much research in the 
general marketing literature (e.g., Moorman et al., 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Uzzi, 1997) 
and in the international marketing literature (e.g., Nes et al., 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 
2009; Leonidou et al., 2011) have studied the creation of trust in the relationships between 
exchange partners. Indeed, Samie and Walters (2003) found trust is the most common 
construct investigated in international relationship studies. Trust is an important ingredient for 
successful learning and for developing new knowledge (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009), which 
is a central factor in the stages theories of internationalization. Following the previous line of 
reasoning, we expect that the principal has lower pre-change trust in market-to-market 
replacements of independent intermediaries than in retained intermediaries, but higher trust in 
market-to-hierarchy replacements. After replacement, trust in the new independent 
intermediary is, as previously argued, expected to be higher than the trust in the replaced 
intermediary.  
 
Commitment 
Commitment has long been recognized as a central construct in firms’ internationalization and 
in interorganizational relations. Management perceptions of exporting and their commitment 
in some form or another is related to export performance (Axinn, 1988, Aaby and Slater, 
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1989). This is necessary in order to build the distribution network and information channels 
crucial for the firm to engage in the export learning process (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009). This line of research, however, addressed 
commitment to international marketing as such. Our study addresses commitment to foreign 
intermediaries. Commitment to the foreign independent intermediary is positively related to 
the performance in the market (Nes et al., 2007). The economic benefits that foster exporters’ 
commitment include importers’ specific investments, importers’ role performance, and 
exporters’ economic performance (Obadia, 2010). Commitment is also recognized in the 
general marketing literature as an essential ingredient for successful long-term relationships 
(Dwyer et al., 1987; Moorman et al., 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Trust and commitment 
are related because commitment to a partner increases the company’s vulnerability to that 
partner’s opportunistic behavior. An organization would hardly be committed to a partner that 
cannot be trusted, and trust is a major determinant of commitment (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Nes 
et al., 2007).  
Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 23) defined commitment as “An exchange partner 
believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum 
efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the relationship is worth 
working on to ensure that it endures indefinitely.” The definition itself is in conflict with 
relationship replacement. Thus, we expect that terminated relationships have lower 
commitment than retained relationships in both market-to-market replacements and in market-
to-hierarchy replacements. As argued previously, we expect post-change commitment to be 
higher than pre-change commitment in market to market replacements.   
 
Marketing control 
Marketing control is the ability of the exporter to control the marketing undertaken in the 
importing country. Petersen et al. (2000) found that controllability (that is the exporter’s 
ability to control the intermediary) correlated negatively with market-to-market switches. 
Madsen et al. (2012), however, found that managers keep control of decision making in their 
relations with foreign independent intermediaries to an extent that may negatively influence 
export performance. More control in these relations is not necessarily better. Internalizing 
local distribution gives higher control. This is one of the most attractive features of wholly 
owned distribution companies, and companies use scarce resources in internalizing 
distribution channels to obtain such control. Use of independent intermediaries gives less 
control, but the level of control will vary between companies and between individual 
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relationships. Building on the findings in Petersen et al. (2000), we expect that principals have 
lower pre-change control in market-to-market replacements than in retained relationships. We 
also expect pre-change marketing control is higher in market-to-hierarchy replacements than 
in retained relationships. Finally, we expect post-change control to be higher than pre-change 
control is in both market to market replacements and in market to hierarchy replacements. 
 
Performance 
Performance is related to commitment to the dealer in domestic settings (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994) and to commitment to the foreign intermediary in international settings (Nes et al., 
2007). Previous studies of the role of performance in international intermediary replacements 
have studied performance in terms of various qualitative outcomes, for example, process 
performance ( Ellis, 2005) and exporters’ satisfaction with the performance in terms of market 
penetration, profitability, and effort made (Petersen et al., 2006). Qualitative outcomes will 
often precede financial performance outcomes, because financial performance is considered a 
consequence of qualitative outcomes. We distinguish between achievements of strategic 
objectives as performance indicator (Cavusgil and Zou, 1994) and financial performance, and 
believe that achievement of both strategic goals and financial performance is influenced by 
intermediary replacements. We expect performance (financial performance and strategic goal 
achievement) follows the pattern discussed above: the pre-change performance of market-to-
market replacements is lower than the performance of retained intermediaries while market-
to-hierarchy replacements have higher performance than retained intermediaries do. Finally, 
we expect post-change performance to be higher than pre-change performance is in both 
cases.  
We summarize this discussion with the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a–f Pre-replacement evaluations in market-to-market replacements: 
Pre-replacement evaluations of a) commitment, b) trust, c) communication, d) control, e) 
financial performance, and f) strategic goal achievement are lower in terminated exporter-
intermediary relationships than in retained relationships when the independent intermediary is 
replaced by a new independent intermediary. 
 
H2a–f Pre-replacement evaluations in market-to-hierarchy replacements: 
Pre-replacement evaluations of a) commitment are lower while evaluations of b) trust, c) 
communication, d) control, e) financial performance, and f) strategic goal achievement are 
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higher in terminated exporter-intermediary relationships than in retained relationships when 
the independent intermediary is replaced by a new hierarchal entry mode. 
 
H3a–f Post-replacement evaluations in market-to-market replacements: 
Post-replacement evaluations are higher than pre-replacement evaluations of a) commitment, 
b) trust, c) communication, d) control, e) financial performance, and f) strategic goal 
achievement when the intermediary is replaced with a new intermediary.  
 
H4a–f Post-replacement evaluations of market-to-hierarchy replacements: 
Post-replacement evaluations are higher than pre-replacement evaluations of a) control, b) 
financial performance, and c) strategic goal achievement when the intermediary is replaced 
with a new hierarchal entry mode.  
 
Methodology  
We collected our pre-replacement data in a  survey administered through personal interviews. 
Groups of three third-year business students interviewed personally a representative of an 
export company as part of an international marketing course. The teams were given in-class 
training in interviewing, and all teams wrote a report about the company they interviewed and 
the interview experience. The typical level of responsibility of interviewees within the sample 
firms was the export manager, product area manager, or – in many smaller firms – the general 
manager. We asked the firms to answer a number of questions regarding aspects of their 
export activities in four markets, two markets where they were successful and two problem 
markets, in order to ensure variations in the data. As many firms did not use an independent 
intermediary in one or more of the markets and some firms did not complete the questionnaire 
for all four markets, we ended up with information concerning a total of 212 cases of 
independent intermediaries from 117 case companies. The average sales volume of the total 
sample was NOK 557 million, which is very in line with the NOK 552 million average 
obtained by Solberg (2002) in his study of Norwegian exporters based on a randomized 
sample.  
The same companies were approached again 5 years after the first study. We decided 
on the length of the time between the first and the second data collection by considering two 
opposing concerns. Number of actual independent intermediary terminations increase with 
time, and obtaining a sufficient number of cases is a critical issue in this research design. On 
the other hand, it becomes more difficult to follow the history of the cases as time goes by due 
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to problems related to reorganizations, mergers and spin-offs, new informants with 
insufficient command of the history, etc. We decided to conduct the second data collection 5 
years after the first data collection as a compromise between the two concerns. Before the 
interview, we sent an introduction letter to all contact persons in the first survey in order to 
secure the right informant for the second interview. Whenever the contact person no longer 
was available, that person’s name was useful in getting hold of their replacement. Interviews 
in the second study were conducted by telephone. We first asked whether there had been any 
replacement of the independent intermediaries in the countries studied in the first survey. If 
negative, the interview was ended. If positive, we collected new data. The questionnaire for 
the first survey and the questionnaire for the second survey are identical for the variables 
tested. Of the 117 possible companies/informants approached, the results were that 30 of the 
companies had replaced an intermediary. Some companies had replaced the intermediary in 
more than one market, and the companies represented a total of 48 cases of independent 
intermediary replacements.  28 of the remaining companies did not made any changes. We 
did not succeed in interviewing the remaining 59 companies for å variety of reasons: 14 no 
longer existed; the informant was unavailable or impossible to contact in 39 companies, and 6 
companies declined to participate. Of the 48 cases with terminated independent intermediary, 
19 were market-to-market changes, 14 were market-to-hierarchy changes, and the remaining 
15 involved other operation mode changes. The post-termination sample sizes are small for 
statistical testing. This also implies that hypotheses may be rejected in our study that could 
have been accepted with larger samples.  
Communication has, in the general marketing literature, been defined as “formal as 
well as informal meaningful information sharing between firms” (Anderson and Narus, 1990; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994). However, this definition does not distinguish between information 
given and information received. This may be an important distinction in international 
marketing because the foreign intermediary is often an important information source 
regarding general host-country business factors beyond the dyad factors (Benito et al., 1993; 
Gripsrud et al., 2006). The more general definition of communication in The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary (1964) as “the way in which information is given (act of imparting esp. news; 
information given) and received” has this distinction. Our definition of communication 
combines the two definitions as follows: communication is the way formal and informal 
information is given and received. Our measure is from Nes et al. (2007), and consists of four 
items: formal and informal information given, formal and informal information received.  
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Moorman et al. (1993, p. 82) define trust as “willingness to rely on an exchange 
partners in whom one has confidence.” Morgan and Hunt (1994) refer to several studies that 
suggest that confidence on the part of the trusting party results from the firm belief that the 
trustworthy party is reliable and has high integrity. In line with this, our measure of trust has 
three items taken from Nes et al. (2007), measuring the representatives’ reliability, integrity, 
and trustworthiness. Control theorists distinguish between process and output control (Bello 
and Gilliland, 1997; Celly and Frazier, 1996; de Mortanges and Vossen, 1999). Output control 
includes monitoring the representatives’ performance like sales, market penetration, etc., and 
process control means control of the factors that lead up to the performance. Mohr et al. 
(1996), in discussing the manufacturer’s control over the dealer, emphasized that control 
implies that the controlled has relinquished some degree of autonomy over its decisions, 
which reflects restrictions in scope and latitude of decision making. Control implies that one 
party has achieved the ability to influence. In our model, we address the effects of exporter 
control over the intermediary, and the ability to influence distinction is important for our 
purpose. In terms of the process and outcome distinction, we emphasize the process 
dimension. Our study deals with marketing processes, and the exporter’s perceived control of 
how activities related to place, price, product, and brand profile (the 4Ps) are executed in the 
importing country is an expression of this. The control measure consists of one item for the 
exporters’ perceived control of each of the 4Ps. Our measure of commitment consists of three 
items from Nes et al. (2007), which are derived from Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) definition: 
importance, maximum effort to maintain and maintain forever.  
 Different conceptualizations and operationalizations of export performance have 
resulted in a variety of measurement schemes that emphasize different dimensions of 
performance. Madsen (1987) divided the performance measures into three categories: profit, 
sales, and change measures. These categories explained 82% of the variations in a factor 
analysis of 14 performance measures (Shoham, 1998). This analysis indicates the three 
categories represented export performance quite well. Our financial performance items are 
from Nes et al. (2007), and consist of three subjective items which represent Madsen’s (1987) 
three categories. In addition, we have a single-item measure of goal achievement akin to the 
measure used by Cavusgil and Zou (1994) in order to capture some of the strategic 
performance elements. The constructs were measured on a 1–5 Likert scale, where 5 is the 
highest score. The items are reported in table 1. 
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Table 1  Scale Items 
          Factor score      Alpha     
Commitment               .87 
The relationship is something we feel strongly attached to.          .900                    
The relationship is something we plan to maintain forever.          .898 
The relationship deserves our maximum effort to maintain.          .873 
 
Trust               .79 
The representative is reliable.             .865 
The representative always does the right thing.           .807 
The representative has high integrity.            .842 
 
Communication             .83 
We have a well-functioning formal system to give information in this relationship.       .817                  
We have a well-functioning formal system to receive information in this relationship.       .824 
Also informally, we give satisfactory information in this relationship         .815 
Also informally, we receive satisfactory information in this relationship                                   .808 
 
Control                                                                                                                                                               .81  
We have good control with our brand profile.                                                                    .812 
We have good control with our product strategies.                                                            .875 
We have good control over pricing policies.                                                                       .774 
We have good control with our distribution.                                                                      .740 
 
Performance              .85 
How is performance in this country in relation to the total company  
performance (both domestically and internationally)? 
Profitability               .865  
Change in profits last three years             .935 
Change in sales last three years             .839 
 
Goal achievement 
We have reached our goals in this market. 
 
 
 
Analysis and discussion  
Measurement reliability was tested by Cronbach’s alpha (see table 1), which are all above .8 
except trust (.79). Nunnally (1978) suggested coefficient alphas above .70 may suffice for 
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research at the early stages of development, while .80 should be the minimum in applied 
research. We conclude that the coefficient alphas are satisfactory in our study. The Pearson 
correlations of the pre-change variables are reported in table 2. All correlations are significant 
at the .01 level, but suggest eventual multicolliniarity problems are on an acceptable level.  
 We analyze H1a–f and H2 a–f concerning pre-replacement characteristics and discuss 
the findings. This is followed by analysis and discussion of H3a–f post-replacement 
consequences. 
 
Table 2  Pearson correlations 
 Communi- 
cation 
Trust Commit-
ment 
Control Financial 
performance 
Goal 
achievement 
Communi- 
cation 
1 .489 .516 .400 .275 .306 
Trust 
 
 1 .451 .300 .240 .337 
Commit- 
ment 
  1 .325 .453 .427 
Control 
 
   1 .271 .360 
Financial 
Performance 
    1 .632 
Goal 
Achievement 
     1 
All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  
Pre-replacement characteristics 
 
Hypotheses H1a–f and hypotheses H2 a–f were tested by ANOVA and Games-Howell post-
hoc tests. The results are reported in table 3. 
          We expected in hypotheses H1 a–f that market-to-market independent intermediary 
replacements would have less favorable pre-replacement evaluations of the variables than 
exporters who retained the independent intermediary did. All differences are in the expected 
direction, but only trust is significant. Thus, H1a commitment is rejected, H1b trust is 
accepted (p < 0.1), while H1c communication, H1d control, H1e financial performance, and 
H1f goal achievement are rejected.  
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 Hypotheses H2a–f concern pre-replacement characteristics of market-to-hierarchy 
replacements. We report the results from the Games-Howell test of mean score differences in 
table 3. We hypothesized lower commitment, but higher evaluations of trust, communication, 
control, financial performance, and goal achievement in terminated market-to-hierarchy 
relationships than in retained relationships. H2b trust, H2c communication, and H2d control 
were accepted, while H2a commitment, H2e financial performance, and H2f goal 
achievement were rejected. We also include the significance of pre-replacement differences 
between market-to-market and market-to-hierarchy replacements in table 3. Among the 
terminated intermediaries, market-to-market replacements are characterized as having 
significantly lower trust, lower communication, and lower control than market-to-hierarchy 
replacements do.  
We tested the U-shaped relationship between independent intermediary performance 
and replacement (Ellis, 2005; Petersen et al., 2006). The curvilinear effects were modeled as 
the squared effects of the two variables. We tested various models, including models that 
treated trust, commitment, control, and communication as covariates, but none were 
significant. The data in this study do not support the trader’s dilemma expressed by the 
proposed U-shape between performance and intermediary replacement. The reasoning behind 
the proposed trader’s dilemma is that successful intermediaries may be replaced by a new 
hierarchal operation mode, for example, the exporter finds that the business in the market has 
reached a sufficient level to merit a sales subsidiary. Poor performing intermediaries, on the 
other hand, tend to be replaced by new independent intermediaries. Thus, the intermediary is 
in danger of being replaced when the performance is high and when the performance is low. 
Though Ellis (2005) and Petersen et al. (2006) established the U-shaped relationship 
empirically, the explained variances in their models were low (≤ 10% in all models), and they 
found no support for the hypothesis that poor performance drives market-to-market 
replacements and that high performance drives market-to-hierarchy replacements. The latter 
findings are confirmed in our data (see table 3), which show no difference between market-to-
market replacements and market-to-hierarchy replacements concerning the two performance 
variables, financial performance and goal achievement (see table 3). Trust, control, and 
communication, however, seem to give better explanations of the type of replacement than the 
performance variables do. The relationships between exporter and independent intermediaries 
in market-to-hierarchy replacements are characterized as having higher levels of trust, 
communication, and control than relationships in market-to-market replacements do (see table 
3).   
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Table 3    Testing Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
Games-Howell test of mean score differences pre-replacement data 
    
  1.No change  2.Market to 3.Market to  
   market change  hierarchy change  
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Commitment 
Mean  2.25 1.89  2.31 
Mean difference from no change    .37  -.06 
Significance of difference from no change   n.s.  n.s. 
Hypotheses H1a and H2a                        H1a = rejected   H2a = rejected 
Significance of difference 2-3 = n.s. 
._______________________________________________________________________________ 
Trust 
Mean  2.58 2.18  3.17 
Mean difference from no change    .41  -.58   
Significance of difference from no change  .10  .02 
Hypotheses H1b and H2b                                                      H1b = accepted    H2b = accepted  
Significance of difference 2-3 = 0.00 
.______________________________________________________________________________ 
Communication  
Mean  2.27 1.87  2.82 
Mean difference from no change    .41  -.55 
Significance of difference from no change   n.s.  .03 
Hypotheses H1c and H2c                                                      H1c = rejected    H2c = accepted  
Significance of difference 2-3 = 0.01 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Control 
Mean  2.07 1.95  2.89 
Mean difference from no change    .12  -.81 
Significance of difference from no change   n.s.  .02  
Hypotheses H1d and H2d                                                      H1d = rejected    H2d = accepted 
Significance of difference 2-3 = 0.03  
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Financial performance 
Mean  1.80 1.72  1.67 
Mean difference from no change    .08  .13 
Significance of difference from no change   n.s.  n.s. 
Hypotheses H1e and H2e                                                      H1e = rejected    H2e = rejected   
Significance of difference 2-3 = n.s. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Goal achievement 
Mean  1.51 1.05  1.29 
Mean difference from no change    .45  .22 
Significance of difference from no change   n.s.  n.s. 
Hypotheses H1f and H2f                                                      H1f = rejected    H2f = rejected   
Significance of difference 2-3 = n.s. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
n no change = 179; n market-to-market change = 19; n market-to-hierarchy change = 14 
Scale = 1–5  
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 Post-replacement characteristics 
We expected in hypotheses H3a–f that post-replacement evaluations would be more favorable 
than pre-replacement evaluations were. The results of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests are 
reported in table 4.  
 
Table 4     Testing Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests of differences in means pre- and post-replacement 
 Commit- 
ment 
Trust            Communi- 
cation 
Control Financial 
performance 
Goal  
achievement 
Market to market 
change 
      
Mean pre-change 1.89 2.17 1.87 1.95 1.72 1.05 
Mean post-change 2.44 3.18 2.74 2.76 1.97 2.00 
Difference   .55* 1.00***  .87***   .82***   .24 n.s.   .95** 
Z-scores -1.672 -3.101 -2.994 -2.800 -.762 -2.010 
Hypotheses H3a–f H3a 
accepted 
H3b 
accepted 
H3c 
accepted 
H3d 
accepted 
H3e   
rejected  
H3f  
accepted 
Market to hierarchy 
change 
      
Mean pre-change    2.89 1.67 1.29 
Mean post-change    3.07 2.17 2.36 
Difference      .19 n.s.   .51* 1.07*** 
Z-scores    -.473 -1.719 -2.549 
Hypotheses H4a-c    H4a 
rejected 
H4b 
accepted 
H4c 
accepted 
  * = significant at .1; ** = significant at .05; *** = significant at .01. 
 
The analysis of market to market replacements shows that all post-replacement means are 
higher than the pre-replacement means, and five of the six differences are significant. H3a 
commitment is accepted though the statistical significance is low (mean difference .55), z = -
1,672, p < .1). These are new exporter-intermediary relationships and some commitment 
drivers (e.g., specific investments) may initially be quite low, but accumulate as business 
grows. Trust, communication, and control show significant improvements from the replaced 
intermediary. H3b trust is accepted (mean difference 1.00), z = -3,101, p < .01). H3c 
communication is accepted (mean difference .87), z = -2,994, p < .01. H3d control is accepted 
(mean difference .82), z = -2,800, p < .01. The effects of market-to-market replacement on the 
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performance indicators are mixed. Financial performance seems not to be affected in the time 
period from replacement to data collection (0–5years) since H3e is rejected (mean difference 
.24), z = -,762. This does not rule out that financial performance may improve later as a 
consequence of higher trust, commitment, communication, and control. H3d concerning goal 
achievement is accepted (mean difference ,95), z = -2,010, p < .05, which means that 
exporters felt a higher degree of goal achievement after  the  intermediary was  replaced by a 
new independent intermediary. We conclude that the relationships and the strategic goal 
achievements with the new independent intermediaries are much improved compared to those 
with the previous intermediaries, but this improvement has not yet resulted in improved 
financial performance. 
 Hypotheses H4a–f concern the effects of replacing the independent intermediary with 
a hieratical entry mode (sales subsidiary or home-based direct sales). The Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank tests in table 4 show that H4a control is rejected (mean difference = .19), z = -0,473. 
The improvement in financial performance in the market is significant, and H4b is accepted 
(mean difference .51), z = -1,719, p < .1. Goal achievement post–market-to-hierarchy 
replacement is significantly higher, and H4c is accepted (mean difference 1,07), z = -2,549, p 
< .001. We find it interesting that H4d control is not significant. Control is, according to 
transaction cost theory, a major motive for internal organization of economic activity, but the 
high level of pre-replacement marketing control in particular and the limited improvement in 
control after a change to internal operations indicate that increased marketing control is not a 
very important factor in these cases.  
 
Implications and conclusions 
Palmatier et al. (2007) suggested that 4 theoretical perspectives dominate interorganizational 
relationship performance: commitment-trust, dependence, transaction cost theory, and 
relational norms. Their empirical comparison of the frameworks suggested that commitment, 
trust, and relation-specific investments are key direct drivers of relational outcomes, while 
variables like opportunism, communication, relational norms, and dependence are not.  
This study is the first we are aware of that has analyzed the pre-replacement trust, 
commitment, communication, marketing control, goal achievement, and financial 
performance characteristics of exporter – independent intermediary relationships that are 
retained compared to market-to-market replacements and market-to-hierarchy replacements. 
Also, being the first to use a longitudinal design for pre- and post-replacement comparison, 
we answer a call by Ellis (2005) to record the exporters’ perceptions of intermediaries, before 
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returning later to search for actual instances. As pointed out by Ellis (2005), such instances 
are hard to come by, and the small sample in this study confirms the difficulties in obtaining a 
sample that’s large enough for statistical analysis. Nevertheless, all differences in our study 
are in the expected direction and more than half of the hypothesized relationships are 
statistically confirmed. Still, the limited number of cases in our study may well have led to 
rejection of many of the hypotheses in table 3. The study should be repeated with a larger 
sample. We began with 212 cases of independent intermediaries from 117 case companies 
and found 48 cases of terminated intermediaries 5 years thereafter. This indicates that the total 
sample should be at least 1,000 cases in order to reach a satisfactory net sample for this type 
of research design.  
Another issue is the dyadic nature of exporter-intermediary relationships. Previous 
research, including our study, collected data from the exporter only. However, a relationship 
has at least 2 parties, and the motives and initiatives for replacement may come from either 
party. There are several reasons why an independent intermediary would terminate a 
relationship, for example, an offer from a more attractive competitor, the intermediary is 
acquired by a competitor, changes in the intermediary’s strategic product range, and the 
intermediary’s dissatisfaction with performance. The need for dyadic data collection may be 
more urgent in market-to-market replacements than in market-to-hierarchy replacements 
because the latter include change of operation mode, which inherently is strongly motivated 
by the principal.   
We also notice that the “trader’s dilemma” of a U-shaped relationship between 
intermediary replacements and performance assumes that all replacements are motivated by 
the exporters’ evaluations of the intermediaries. Intermediary-initiated replacements may 
distort the U-shape between the exporter’s perceptions of intermediary performance and 
replacements. This may explain the relatively weak empirical support so far for the U-shape.  
There is a need for more research into this issue where the problem of intermediary initiated 
replacements are accounted for.  
 The most important implications of our research for managers of international 
operations are from the post-replacement data while the pre-replacement data give the most 
important normative business insights for independent intermediaries. Market-to-hierarchy 
replacements are characterized as having higher trust, communication, and control than 
retained relationships do (table 3), but not higher performance. The intermediary may be a 
valuable future partner for the principal, and it may be in the interest of the principal to 
acquire an intermediary with whom it has a good working relationship. If a buy-out is 
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contrary to the interest of the independent intermediary the intermediary may actively work to 
prevent this by building switching costs, for example, keep control of customer relations, 
build own brand, limit the principal’s learning, and have the principal’s products be a small 
part of the intermediary’s total business. If a buy-out is of interest for the intermediary then 
the intermediary has a stronger bargaining position when she has a high degree of control with 
control the same resources (e.g. customer relations, brand, local technical competence). 
Therefore, control of the local resources are always beneficial for the intermediary when the 
principal evaluates to replace the intermediary with a sales subsidiary or home based sales 
office.   
Trust, commitment, control, communication, and goal achievement were more 
sensitive to the different conditions in the study than financial performance was. The post-
replacement financial performance of market-to-hierarchy replacements was higher than pre–
replacement performance, but otherwise the differences in financial performance were not 
significant. Long-run financial performance is a goal in all for-profit organizations, and the 
other variables in our study are drivers of this goal. Improvements in the drivers precede 
improvements in the financial performance. When market-to-hierarchy replacements already 
seem to have absorbed the switching costs and obtain higher financial performance than the 
previous independent intermediary operation mode (table 4), then this must be an indicator of 
successful intermediary replacement and operation mode change. 
The improvements in post-replacement evaluations (table 4) for both market-to-market 
and for market to hierarchy replacements are striking. These improvements are perhaps the 
most important managerial implications of this research for international marketers. The post-
replacement evaluations are significantly higher for seven of the nine tests. Both market to 
market and market to hierarchy replacements are highly successful. Success on an aggregate 
level does not necessarily imply success on the individual level. Nevertheless, we believe our 
findings support the premise that managers of international operations may benefit from a 
dynamic management style of their independent intermediaries. A common saying states that 
reorganizations usually come too late and do not go far enough. There are opportunities for 
improved interorganizational relationships and higher performance for companies that are 
pro-active in reorganizing their international independent intermediary networks.  
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